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Note
The Changing Burden of Employer Liability for
Workplace Discrimination
Elizabeth M. Brama*
Kimberly Ellerth worked as a salesperson for Burlington
Industries before she quit, claiming she had been forced out of
her job by workplace sexual harassment.' Ellerth alleged that
Ted Slowik, a supervisor and vice president of her division, re-
peatedly propositioned her, made lewd and offensive sexual
remarks, and threatened her job when she declined his ad-
vances. 2 Ellerth did not inform her superiors about Slowik's
behavior, however, and did not suffer any economic detriment
because Slowik never followed through on his threats.3 Ellerth
filed EEOC charges following her resignation and later sued
Burlington, claiming that Slowik's sexual harassment and her
alleged constructive discharge violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.4 The federal district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Burlington on Ellerth's claims, concluding
that the company did not know or have reason to know about
the harassment.5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sit-
ting en banc, reversed in eight separate opinions.6 The Su-
preme Court held that Ellerth may have stated a sexual har-
assment claim and remanded the case to give her the
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1997,
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN. I would like to thank Jeffrey G. Vigil
for his assistance as I formulated and drafted this Note, and Tracy M. Smith,
whose question lead inadvertently to this topic.
1. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 2262-63.
5. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1118 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
6. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
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opportunity to state a hostile work environment claim. 7 In re-
manding the case, the Court also gave Burlington the opportu-
nity to prove (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct harassment, and (2) that Ellerth unreasonably
failed to take advantage of Burlington's anti-harassment poli-
cies.8
In a companion case, the Supreme Court also ruled on the
claims of Beth Ann Faragher, a female lifeguard for the city of
Boca Raton, who experienced similar unwanted sexual ad-
vances and offensive comments. 9 Male lifeguards supervising
Faragher told her to "[d]ate me or clean toilets for a year"; sug-
gested she should have sex with them because all the female
lifeguards had sex with the male lifeguards; simulated sex
with another female lifeguard; and made crude, disparaging
remarks about the shape of Faragher's body.10 Faragher did
not complain to higher management about this conduct," but
brought a claim against the City after she quit, alleging that it
had allowed the lifeguard supervisors to create a hostile work
environment. 12 The district court held that the city was liable
for its employees' conduct because it should have known about
the pervasive harassment.13 An en banc Eleventh Circuit re-
versed because it found that the lifeguards were not acting
within the scope of their employment.14 The Supreme Court
reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, holding that the city
was vicariously liable because it unreasonably failed to prom-
ulgate a sexual harassment prevention policy.15
7. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271 (noting that Ellerth's arguments in
the Court of Appeals had focused on "existing case law which held out the
promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims," and instructing the
district court to determine whether to allow Ellerth to amend her complaint in
light of the Court's decision in Burlington).
8. See id. at 2270-71.
9. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (1998).
10. Id. at 2280-81.
11. See id. at 2281.
12. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1561 (S.D. Fla.
1994).
13. See id. at 1563-64. The court also found that Faragher's supervisors
were acting as the city's agents when they harassed Faragher. See id. at1564. The court awarded one dollar in damages to Faragher for her Title VII
claims. See id. at 1565.
14. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir.
1997) (en banc).
15. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293 (holding that the City of Boca Raton
did not satisfy its duty to prevent and remedy harassment because the city
1482 [Vol. 83:1481
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In 1998, the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. El-
lerth changed the landscape of sexual harassment law.16 These
companion cases highlight the lack of uniformity in lower
courts regarding the applicable standards for assessing em-
ployer liability for workplace sexual harassment.17 Although
the Supreme Court announced a definitive standard in Bur-
lington and Faragher, it did so by utilizing the old McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting scheme18 and by promulgating a
unique affirmative defense for employers seeking to avoid li-
ability.1 9 As the Burlington decision illustrates, the new af-
firmative defense so diverges from previous lower court ap-
proaches that many appellate courts have remanded sexual
harassment cases for more discovery regarding employers'
ability to assert the defense.20
did nothing to disseminate its harassment policy, did not check the conduct of
beachfront employees, and did not provide a means by which the female life-
guards could report harassment to someone with greater authority than the
harassing supervisors).
16. Burlington and Faragher were both decided on June 26, 1998.
17. See supra notes 5, 6, 12-14 and accompanying text. The question of
when an employer should be liable for the torts of its employees has been
called "[olne of the most hotly contested legal questions in sexual harassment
litigation today" and 'the most difficult legal question' in a sexual harassment
case." SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 23.01 (1997) (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.
1983)). This is not surprising because the plaintiff-employee is rarely har-
assed by the actual employer because the "employer" is usually an institution
or corporation. Rather, the harasser is either a co-worker or supervisor. The
plaintiff-employee, however, often wants to sue the employer either because
the employer has the financial or other means to remedy the situation, or be-
cause the employee wants the employer to take responsibility for its work-
place environment. The question then arises whether the employer should be
liable for its employees' inappropriate actions, and, if so, to what extent.
18. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
19. See Dominic Bencivenga, Looking for Guidance: High Court Rulings
Leave Key Terms Undefined, 220 N.Y. L.J. 5, 8 (1998) (noting that the Bur-
lington and Faragher decisions "include new guidelines for establishing liabil-
ity, and for the first time, allow employers a defense against liability").
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Reinhold v. Virginia,
151 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 1998) (remanding the case to the district court for
a determination whether the employer had an anti-harassment policy in place
and whether the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of it); Al-
verio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 9 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. ll. 1998) (denying a
motion for summary judgment because the lack of evidence in the record pro-
hibited the court from determining whether Sam's could invoke the vicarious
liability affirmative defense).
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This Note evaluates the Supreme Court's new affirmative
defense for employers and considers its effect on existing tests
for Title VII harassment and discrimination.21 Part I describes
employer liability standards as they existed before the Su-
preme Court decided Burlington and Faragher. Part H exam-
ines Burlington and Faragher's place in the search for a rea-
sonable employer liability standard for all Title VH claims.
Part H also asserts that harassment and discrimination stan-
dards should be streamlined for the benefit of litigants, for the
sake of consistency in Title VII adjudication, and to promote
judicial economy. This Note concludes that the Court's crea-
tion of a valid affirmative defense is a cue that the McDonnell
Douglas analysis must be subtly altered so that the proper
analysis of employer liability for workplace harassment de-
pends only on the ability to prove a tangible or non-tangible job
detriment.
21. Harassment is a subset and extension of the original protections
against discrimination provided by Title VII. For the purposes of this Note,
however, the term "harassment" is used to indicate the kind of bothersome
and threatening behavior that occurred in Burlington and Faragher. Har-
assment includes, for example, unwanted sexual pestering (hostile work envi-
ronment) and threats to fire or deny promotion unless an employee cooperates
with sexual advances (quid pro quo). In the latter example, it does not matter
whether the person threatening the employee carries through with the threat.
Thus, "harassment" is simply a broad term covering both quid pro quo and
hostile work environment claims.
"Discrimination" encompasses all other Title VII violations except retalia-
tion. It refers to a disparate impact or disparate treatment based on the vic-
tim's membership in a protected class and is a separate cause of action from
workplace harassment. An example of "discrimination" as it is used here is
the failure to hire a woman because of her race or gender.
It is necessary to distinguish between discrimination cases and harass-
ment cases. Before the Burlington and Faragher decisions, the proper test for
employer liability depended significantly on whether the plaintiff brought a
discrimination or harassment action. This Note argues that the correct
analysis after Burlington and Faragher is to group all claims based on
whether they resulted in a tangible job detriment (as in quid pro quo and dis-
crimination claims), see infra note 31, or merely affected the terms and condi-
tions of employment.
1484 [Vol. 83:1481
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I. THE STATE OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE AGENCY
RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE BURLINGTON AND
FARAGHER
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HARASSMENT CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful
to materially change the job conditions of an employee because
of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22 Title
VII allowed an employee to sue for sex discrimination in the
same way he or she could sue for racial or religious discrimina-
tion. Although sex was included in the language of Title VII, it
did not initially garner the same respect as other protected
classes. 23 Consequently, the first harassment cases resulted
from claims of race, rather than sex, discrimination.24
Harassment was not immediately recognized as a cause of
action under Title VII. It was not until 1980 that the EEOC
promulgated guidelines 25 allowing a cause of action for "sexual
harassment" as a form of sex discrimination. 26 Sexual harass-
22. Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
23. Gender protection had an inauspicious beginning, "sex" was added as
an amendment to the bill in an attempt to kill it. Despite this attempt, the
amendment was approved, and the bill was signed into law on July 2, 1964.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 15, 26 (2d
ed. 1995).
24. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating:
Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 100 (1995). The first employer liability
case involved a plaintiff-employee who was discharged for his inability to get
along with co-workers who inflicted racial insults upon him. See id. (citing
EEOC Dec. No. YSF 9-108, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 922 (1969)). The
EEOC held that the plaintiff had an actionable Title VII claim because an
"[e]mployer is required to maintain a working environment free of racial in-
timidation." Id.
25. The EEOC guidelines define sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sex-
ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature." EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1614.11(a) (1997).
26. Women began to bring sexual harassment claims even before the
EEOC proposed recognizing sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII, but
courts were skeptical. They found those claims "ludicrous" and believed that
"the only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to have
employees who were asexual." BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX
1486 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1481
ment claims brought pursuant to Title VII have, however, in-
creased dramatically in recent years. 27 In the wake of this ex-
plosion of sexual harassment litigation, sexual harassment
claims are now commonly understood to fall into one of two
categories: "quid pro quo" claims and "hostile work environ-
ment" claims.
The courts have established the "quid pro quo" and "hostile
work environment" terminology to distinguish between differ-
ent kinds of harassment.28 "Quid pro quo" harassment occurs
when a supervisor or employer threatens to impose a job det-
riment on an employee if he or she fails to respond invitingly to
the supervisor's sexual advances.29 A job detriment generally
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 580 (2d ed.
1996) (quoting Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz.
1975)).
The EEOC's proposed new claim for "sexual harassment" also met with a
great deal of opposition during the public commentary period, especially from
then-Reagan transition appointee Clarence Thomas. See Oppenheimer, supra
note 24, at 115-16. Thomas was worried that this new claim would result in
many frivolous lawsuits and attempts to accomplish the impossible task of
ridding the workplace of insult. See id. at 116. The regulations were none-
theless adopted in September of 1980, and EEOC director Eleanor Holmes
Norton signed them into law in November of that year. See id. at 114.
27. The number of sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC in-
creased from 75 in 1980 to 7,495 in 1991 and has continued to rise. See 1
ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 3
(2d ed. 1994). The number of charges filed with the EEOC and with state
agencies increased by 150% between 1990 and 1995. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, SEX
DISCRIMINATION ISSUES A-3 (1998). It is for this reason that the background
of this Note focuses to such an extent on employer liability for sexual harass-
ment. Discussions about employer liability for harassment have focused
largely on gender harassment, and this is the area in which harassment
analysis is most fully developed.
28. The terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" were not
found in any statute or EEOC guideline. They were instead first used in law
reviews, and then adopted by the courts. See CATHARINE A. MACKINON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979); see also Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n.18, 909 (11th Cir. 1982).
29. Quid pro quo is a unique form of gender discrimination resulting in a
tangible job detriment. By definition, the supervisor uses his or her power
over the employee to request a sexual favor. See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note
26, at 581.
The early cases all dealt with a form of sexual harassment that has
come to be known as "quid pro quo" harassment .... In these situa-
tions, supervisors fired women or denied them promotions or took
other action that adversely affected their employment status be-
cause the women had rejected the supervisor's sexual advances.
Id.; see also Martha F. Davis, Court Clarifies Sexual Harassment Tests:
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
involves a threatened demotion, termination, transfer, or de-
crease in responsibility and must be more serious than a mere
inconvenience to be actionable.30 These kinds of detriments are
known as "tangible job detriments."31
Conversely, a hostile work environment claim does not in-
volve a tangible job detriment. Rather, in this type of case, the
co-worker or supervisor badgers the employee with unwanted
attention that significantly interferes with the employee's
work.32 The Supreme Court first recognized this kind of har-
assment claim in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.33 In
Meritor, the Court determined that a hostile work environment
claim is not actionable unless the plaintiff-employee could
show that the harassment was both abusive and serious
enough to alter the conditions of employment.34 The Court
Same-Sex Harassment Is Deemed Actionable; Employers May Be Vicariously
Liable, but Not Schools, NATL L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B10 (The classic exam-
ple of quid pro quo harassment is the threat, uttered by someone with actual
or apparent authority, of'sleep with me or you're fired."). Because the propo-
sition (accompanied by a threat) is usually sexual in nature, it tends to depend
on the sex of the victim. This common dependence makes quid pro quo a
uniquely gender-related cause of action; it is one claim that is extremely un-
likely to be available for victims suffering from racial, ethnic, or religious dis-
crimination.
30. See BABCOCKETAL., supra note 26, at 581.
31. In Burlington and Faragher, the Supreme Court required courts to
focus on the impact on the employee rather than on the acts of the employers.
See infra note 92 and accompanying text. Thus, the employee must prove ei-
ther a tangible job detriment or a non-tangible job detriment that negatively
affects the terms and conditions of employment. A "tangible job detriment"
occurs when an employee suffers an outright harm as a result of discrimina-
tion or harassment. Examples of tangible job detriments include termination,
failure to hire, demotion, unfavorable transfer, and other such negative im-
pacts on the employee. Courts used the tangible job detriment terminology
before Burlington and Faragher, but determined the nature of the plaintiffs
case according to the actions of the employer, not the impact on the employee.
32. According to the EEOC guidelines, a hostile work environment claim
arises whether or not there is a tangible job detriment if the harasser's con-
duct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1997). Such conduct might
include suggestive comments, lewd or racially-insulting jokes, offensive pic-
tures, and the like.
33. 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986).
34. Id. at 67. "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of (the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.' Id. (emphasis added and cita-
tion omitted). However, the test to determine whether an employee suffered
from a hostile work environment is not exact; rather, "whether an environ-
ment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the cir-
14871999]
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thereby made the hostile work environment cause of action a
viable claim for employees, while concurrently limiting the
situations in which the cause of action could be brought.
B. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR DISCRIMINATION UNDER
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
In 1973, the Supreme Court established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green35 a three-part burden-shifting analysis
to determine whether an employer had an improper motive for
imposing a job detriment on an employee and whether the em-
ployer should therefore be liable for discrimination. Percy
Green, an employee of McDonnell Douglas, sued the company,
claiming he had been fired for racially discriminatory rea-
sons.36 McDonnell Douglas maintained that Green was fired
for his participation in illegal protest activities.37 Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the Court, announced a three-part test to de-
termine McDonnell Douglas's liability.38 As this test stands
today, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination.39 If the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to
prove that it had a legitimate business purpose for rejecting
the plaintiff.4 0 If the employer sustains this burden, the bur-
cumstances." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
35. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
36. See id. at 794.
37. See id. at 796.
38. See id. at 802-04.
39. See id. at 802. Plaintiffs originally had to prove four elements to es-
tablish a prima facie case. A complainant had to show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. The Court further noted that "Wtihe facts will vary necessarily in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from re-
spondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
40. See id. at 802. The Supreme Court later noted the significance of this
shift. The burden remains on the plaintiff to adequately establish a prima fa-
cie case to the jury even if the defendant fails to show a legitimate business
motivation for its actions. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 509-10 (1993). If, however, the defendant succeeds in proving a legiti-
mate business reason, summary judgment will be granted to the defendant
despite the showing of a prima facie case. See id. at 510-11. The cause of ac-
tion is only resurrected if the plaintiff succeeds in proving pretext. See id. at
511.
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den again shifts to give the plaintiff the opportunity to prove
that the employer's stated reason was pretext.41 This test has
been adopted and applied to most Title VII claims,42 including
retaliation,43 quid pro quo,44 and hostile work environment 45
claims. After the Court recognized harassment as a valid Title
VII claim, however, it became clear that the McDonnell Doug-
las test was not an appropriate standard upon which to base
employer liability in all situations.46 The reason it was inap-
41. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
42. See Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713 (7th Cir.
1998) ("Although the McDonnell Douglas standard originated and evolved in
cases involving racial discrimination in employment, it has been extended to
all sorts of other discrimination not even limited to the employment setting.").
43. A prima facie case of retaliation requires the employee-complainant to
show three things: (1) he or she filed a charge of discrimination; (2) the em-
ployer took adverse action against the employee; and (3) the adverse action
was linked to the filing of discrimination charges. See Cram v. Lamson &
Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Tinsley v. First Union
Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 442 (4th Cir. 1998) (reiterating that the McDonnell
Douglas proof and burden-shifting rules apply to retaliation and noting the
above requirements for a prima facie case).
44. Currently, there are four elements of a prima facie case of quid pro
quo harassment. The employee must show the following- (1) he or she was a
member of a protected class; (2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome sexual
advances; (3) the request was based on gender; and (4) submission to the re-
quest was a condition for receiving job benefits or avoiding job detriments.
See, e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d at 473; Kauffman v. Allied
Signal Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1991). For situations in which a job
applicant was denied a particular position or promotion, a variation of this
test has been adopted. The complainant must prove: (1) that she is a member
of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances
to which members of the opposite sex were not subjected; (3) that she applied
for the position and was qualified for and the employer was accepting applica-
tions for that position; (4) that she was rejected despite these qualifications;
and (5) that after the rejection, the positions remained open, and other appli-
cants with like qualifications were considered. See Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 911 n.22 (11th Cir. 1982). See generally Eugene Scalia, The
Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POLY 307 (1998).
45. A plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile work environment
by proving the following- (1) the employee was a member of a protected class;
(2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the har-
assment was based on gender; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition,
or privilege of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action. See
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 903-05. See generally Catherine M.
Maraist, Note, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: An Analysis of the Subjective
Perception Test Required by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 57 LA. L. REv.
1343 (1997).
46. Courts might have recognized this whether or not harassment became
such a confused issue. See Latimore, 151 F.3d at 714 (noting, in a situation in
1999] 1489
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propriate for harassment situations is fairly clear-there is
never a legitimate reason for harassing an employee, regard-
less of the employer's motives. Thus, courts needed a different
standard to determine the extent of employer liability for
workplace harassment.
C. SUPERVISOR LIABIUTY STANDARDS FOR WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT LEADING UP TO BURLINGTON AND FARAGHER
Prior to Burlington and Faragher, the extent to which em-
ployers were held liable for workplace harassment was pri-
marily dependent on the particular Title VII cause of action
the plaintiff-employee chose to file.47 Because a quid pro quo
demand usually results in a tangible job detriment, courts have
fairly uniformly held that the employer should be strictly liable
for such acts by its employees. 48 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged this consensus in Meritor, stating that "the courts have
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory dis-
charges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not
the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the su-
pervisor's actions."49
The standard has been less clear, however, for hostile work
environment claims and unfulfilled quid pro quo threats.50 The
which the court was asked to apply McDonnell Douglas to a credit discrimina-
tion case, that "[tihe Supreme Court has reminded us that McDonnell Doug-
las was not intended to be a straitjacket into which every discrimination case
must be forced kicking and screaming") (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802 n.13, and United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983)).
47. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264 (1998). A quid
pro quo claim could result in strict liability, while a hostile work environment
claim lead the courts to apply whatever vicarious liability test edsted in their
jurisdiction. See id. at 2264-65. As the Supreme Court noted, Ellerth brought
a quid pro quo suit (even though her supervisor did not follow through on his
threats) because the strict liability standard gave her a better chance of forc-
ing liability on Burlington Industries than would a hostile work environment
claim. See id. at 2265, 2271.
48. The common presumption is that an employee must be using his or
her agency status to inflict such a detriment, and that employers are respon-
sible for noticing these situations. See N. James Turner, Employer Liability
for Acts of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Respondeat Superior and Be-
yond, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1994, at 41, 42; see also Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d
599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Title VII demands that employers be held strictly
liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of their supervisory per-
sonnel who are delegated the power to make such employment decisions.").
49. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986); see su-
pra text accompanying note 33.
50. The terms "unfulfilled quid pro quo threats" or "incomplete quid pro
1490 [Vol. 83:1481
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Supreme Court raised the issue of vicarious liability for hostile
work environment claims in Meritor, but declined to establish a
standard for determining employer liability. Rather, the Court
simply instructed lower courts to use agency doctrine to dis-
cern liability in this area.5' The Court also noted that the
standard should fall somewhere between strict liability52 and
quo" mean that the harasser threatened a tangible job detriment if the victim
did not comply with sexual demands, but that the harasser never instituted
such a detriment against the employee. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2263.
This category of sexual harassment is usually grouped with hostile work envi-
ronment claims for purposes of determining vicarious liability, because nei-
ther unfulfilled quid pro quo threats nor hostile work environments result in a
tangible job detriment.
5L See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Court stated the following:
We... decline... to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but
we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII,
Congress's decision to define "employer" to include any agent of an
employer.., surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts
of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held re-
sponsible.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Katherine Philippakis, When Employers Should
Be Liable for Supervisory Personnel: Applying Agency Principles to Hostile-
Environment Sexual Harassment Cases, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1275, 1278 (1996)
(noting the void left by Meritor).
52. The EEOC, however, has consistently advocated strict liability.
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment
agency, joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible for
its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with re-
spect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer
and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known
of their occurrence.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.11(c) (1980). The EEOC did temporarily disavow this stance,
though, in its Meritor amicus brief. In that brief, the EEOC proposed that
agency principles lead to
a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment had reasona-
bly available an avenue of complaint regarding such harassment,
and, if available and utilized, whether that procedure was reasonably
responsive to the employee's complaint. If the employer has an ex-
pressed policy against sexual harassment and has implemented a
procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims,
and if the victim does not take advantage of that procedure, the em-
ployer should be shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of
the sexually hostile environment .... In all other cases, the employer
will be liable if it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if, con-
sidering all the facts of the case, the victim in question had no rea-
sonably available avenue for making his or her complaint known to
appropriate management officials.
Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26, Meritor (No. 84-
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allowing employers to avoid liability by claiming ignorance.5 3
Lower federal courts have conscientiously followed this direc-
tive, but the result has been the development of myriad tests
for employer liability.5 4
The Restatement (Second) of Agency 55 offers a number of
theories under which an employer may be held liable for the
torts of its servants.5 6 An employer is generally liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior for. tortious acts of its em-
1979), cited in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71.
Despite this apparent change in the EEOC's stance, Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, also advocated strict li-
ability in a Meritor concurrence:
The Commission, in issuing the Guidelines, explained that its rule
was "in keeping with the general standard of employer liability with
respect to agents and supervisory employees .... [Tihe Commission
and the courts have held for years that an employer is liable if a su-
pervisor or an agent violates the Title VII, regardless of knowledge or
any other mitigating factor." I would adopt the standard set out by
the Commission.
477 U.S. at 75 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980)). The EEOC's apparent
about-face (even though the strict liability EEOC guideline is still in effect),
combined with judicial interpretation of the EEOC's position, has only added
to the confusion about agency theory and vicarious liability.
53. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
54. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
55. The applicable section of the Restatement reads:
§ 219. When Master is Liable for Torts of His Servants
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
56. There are a number of policy justifications for using agency theory to
impose liability on employers for their supervisors' wrongful acts: First, such
liability places some responsibility on the employer to monitor and control its
workplace. Second, liability is placed on the entity with the greatest ability to
provide the harmed employee with relief. Third, this method spreads the risk
of harm as a cost of doing business. Finally, as with agency theory generally,
vicarious liability requires the employer to ensure that it is placing authority
in the hands of responsible people. If the law did not place some responsibil-
ity on the employer, there would be no incentive to choose appropriate, re-
sponsible agents.
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ployees committed within the scope of employment.5 7 Most
courts, however, have been reluctant to find that a sexual har-
asser is acting within the scope of his or her employment.58
Nevertheless, there are two instances in which an em-
ployer may be liable 9 even if the employee is not acting within
the scope of employment.6 0 First, an employer will be liable
when it commits a tort or when it fails to control the work of
others.61 This situation is known as "notice liability" because
the employer is held liable when it knew or should have
known 62 of the harassing conduct and failed to take appropri-
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
58. See Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liabilityfor "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors:
The Search for an Appropriate Standard, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 667, 674 n.38
(1995). EEOC guidelines suggest that "ilt will rarely be the case that an em-
ployer will have authorized a supervisor to engage in sexual harassment ....
However, if the employer becomes aware of work-related sexual misconduct
and does nothing to stop it, the employer, by acquiescing, has brought the su-
pervisor's actions within the scope of employment." EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT § D(2)(c)(1) (1990).
59. See Lewis & Henderson, supra note 58 (noting that courts were most
likely to hold employers' liable under a Restatement § 219(2)(b) notice liability
standard or a § 219(2)(d) "aided by the agency relationship" standard). But
see Oppenheimer, supra note 24, at 72 (classifying employer liability into four
categories). Oppenheimer's first theory of vicarious liability is respondeat su-
perior, in which the employee acts within the scope of his or her employment.
See id. at 72. The second theory provides for employer liability "when an em-
ployee engages in wrongful conduct outside the scope of employment, if the
employee took advantage of his position with the employer to commit the act."
Id. The third theory imposes liability when the employer violated its public
responsibility by delegating a non-delegable duty to employees. See id. Fi-
nally, direct liability is imposed (in Oppenheimer's terminology) when the em-
ployer is negligent enough to be directly responsible for the harassing envi-
ronment. See id.
60. According to some scholars, every instance in which an employer is
liable for its agent's actions outside the scope of employment is called "direct
liability." See Philippakis, supra note 51, at 1280. Scholars use this term be-
cause the employer is liable not for the employee's actions, but for its own
negligent failure to monitor the workplace, inappropriate grant of authority,
negligent hiring and firing, or negligent failure to respond to harassment
about which it should have had actual or constructive knowledge. See id.
Thus, a court applying agency theory to impute employer liability must dis-
tinguish between the confusing terminology of notice liability, vicarious li-
ability, direct liability, and respondeat superior. See supra note 59; infra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
6L See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
62. The Restatement also states that an employer may be liable when the
master intended the conduct or when the employer attempted to delegate a
non-delegable duty, but these standards are rarely used in the sexual har-
assment arena. Rather, notice liability encompasses a more general negli-
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ate remedial measures. 63 The second instance in which an em-
ployer may be held liable even when the employee acts outside
the scope of employment occurs when the agent commits a tort
by means of his or her agency status.64 This situation is
termed "vicarious liability." Under the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, an employer is vicariously liable if the employee is
aided by the agency relationship in carrying out the harass-
ment, or the agent utilized his or her apparent authority65 to
commit a tortious act and the victim relied on that authority.66
While any finding of notice or vicarious liability would en-
sure an employer's liability under the Restatement, federal
courts have not uniformly embraced the Restatement. Courts
have instead mixed notice and vicarious liability standards 67 to
establish a number of different tests.6 8 The result, of course,
depended on each circuit's determination whether harassment
falls within the scope of the harasser's employment 69 and each
circuit's unique application of the principles set forth in the
Restatement.
Prior to Burlington and Faragher, at least six different
employer liability standards emerged as a result of the Meritor
directive.7 0 These standards ranged from an "aided by the
gence standard. See id.
63. Some authors refer only to this as "direct liability." See Oppenheimer,
supra note 24, at 72.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958); see also id.
§ 219(2) cmt.
65. According to the EEOC, a victim has a greater claim that the harasser
acted within the scope of his apparent authority if the employer does not have
a strong anti-harassment policy and effective curative measures. See EEOC
POLICY GUIDANCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 58, § D(2)(c)(2).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958). Others
have noted that one is aided by the agency relationship because he or she has
apparent authority to act on behalf of the employer and close proximity to the
harassed employee. See Philippakis, supra note 51, at 1286, 1292. This alter-
nate theory of vicarious liability may therefore be redundant.
67. According to some legal scholars, this mixture of liability standards
means that the courts have generally been misguided in their application of
agency doctrine. See Oppenheimer, supra note 24, at 73.
68. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
69. Although a determination that harassment fell within the scope of
employment was rare, some circuit courts found it possible. Moreover, the
Restatement provides that "[ain act may be within the scope of employment
although consciously criminal or tortious." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 231 (1958).
70. See Lewis & Henderson, supra note 58, at 670 (introducing a compre-
hensive discussion of previous sexual harassment vicarious liability standards
and consideration of the standards on a circuit-by-circuit basis).
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agency relationship" standard to a negligence/"actual or con-
structive knowledge" standard. In the Seventh71 and Ninth72
Circuits, for example, the primary question was whether the
appropriate managing agent had actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the harassment. In the First,73 Fourth,74 Fifth,75 and
Eighth76 Circuits, an employer was held liable if it knew or
should have known about the hostile work environment but
failed to take appropriate remedial steps.
The other circuits promulgated an even more confusing ar-
ray of standards. An employer in the Second Circuit was liable
if the agent had actual or apparent authority to act on the em-
ployer's behalf, the harasser was aided by the agency relation-
ship, the employer knew or should have known of the hostile
work environment, or the employer had no remedial system in
place.7 7 The Eleventh Circuit adopted a variation of this stan-
dard, finding an employer liable only if the employer knew or
should have known about the harassment and failed to take
remedial action, the harassing employee acted within the scope
of employment, or the harassing employee was aided in the
harassment by the agency relationship.8 In contrast, the
7L See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (stating that a majority of the judges on the
panel agreed that "the standard for employer liability in cases of hostile-
environment sexual harassment by a supervisory employee is negligence, not
strict liability"), affd, Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270
(1998).
72. See Stanford Edward Purser, Note, Young v. Bayer Corp.: When Is
Notice of Sexual Harassment to an Employee Notice to the Employer?, 1998
B.Y.U. L. REV. 909, 919-20 n.51 (citing Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("he proper analysis for employer liability in hostile environment
cases is what management-level employees knew or should have known....")).
73. See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 437 (1st
Cir. 1997).
74 See Reinhold v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 930 (4th Cir. 1998), opinion
withdrawn and superseded upon reh'g, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998).
75. See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.
1992).
76. See Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (8th Cir. 1997);
see also Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 138 F.3d 733, 737-38 (8th Cir. 1998) (de-
clining to impose liability on employer where employer took prompt remedial
action when it learned about employee's sexually harassing behavior).
77. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 563 (1997); see also Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773,
780 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that notice liability is the standard for co-worker
harassment, but that supervisory harassment can be imputed to the employer
by notice or the heightened vicarious liability requirement).
78. See Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 115 F.3d 1548, 1552 (11th
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Third79 and Tenth CircuitsO considered an employer liable if
the employer was negligent in failing to act on notice of har-
assment, the harassing employee acted within the scope of em-
ployment, and the victim relied on the harasser's apparent
authority or the harasser was aided by the agency relationship.
The Sixth Circuit imputed liability if the harassment was fore-
seeable or within the scope of employment and the employer
failed to respond adequately.81 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit simply relied on "common law principles of agency"82 with-
out establishing a definitive test.83
Employer liability standards also differed between circuits
as to the type of employer notice required to satisfy a notice li-
ability standard.84 Some circuits required only that "manage-
ment level" have notice, while others stated that "higher man-
agement" must have notice. 85 This consideration added to the
perplexing collection of employer liability standards among the
circuit. 86
Cir. 1997); Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1530.
79. See Boutonv. BMW of N. Am, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994).
80. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446 (10th Cir.
1997), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998) (remanding
for further consideration in light of Burlington and Faragher).
81. See Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir.
1994).
82. Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
83. The EEOC suggests that courts first consider whether the employer
was directly liable for the harassment because it knew or should have known
about the hostile working environment. If the employer was not directly li-
able, the court should consider whether the employee was acting within the
scope of employment, was acting with apparent authority, was acting in ac-
cordance with a duty the employer should not have delegated, or was aided in
the accomplishment of the harassment by the agency relationship. In other
words, the EEOC has recently suggested that courts should "consider" each of
the principles contained in the Restatement. See EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 58, § D(2)(c)(1)-(3), reprinted in 1 CONTE,
supra note 27, at 358-61.
84 See Purser, supra note 72, at 917.
85. Other factors that might also establish notice to the employer include
the victim's filing a complaint to management or an EEOC charge;
the pervasiveness of the harassment, or ... evidence the employer
had "deliberately turned its back on the problem" of sexual harass-
ment by failing to establish a policy against it and a grievance
mechanism to redress it. Moreover, an employer should be liable if
there is no reasonably available avenue by which victims of sexual
harassment can make their complaints known to appropriate officials
who are in a position to do something about those complaints.
Turner, supra note 48, at 42.
86. The courts have also considered factors outside the scope of the Re-
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An unfortunate disparity in the law resulted from the dif-
fering employer liability standards adopted by the circuits. A
plaintiff could determine the outcome of his or her lawsuit by
suing in a particular jurisdiction 87 or by choosing the cause of
action (quid pro quo, hostile work environment, or discrimina-
tion) under which to bring the suit.88 As sexual harassment
suits became increasingly common,89 it became clear that the
Supreme Court needed to resolve this issue. The Court did so
in the summer of 1998 with its companion decisions in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. El-
lerth.
1I. THE CHANGES BURLINGTONAND FARAGHER
IMPOSED UPON TITLE VII CASES
Burlington and Faragher clarified two major aspects of the
harassment landscape.90 First, they removed the awkward dif-
ferences in employer liability based solely on whether the em-
statement. Some circuits, for example, have held that the standard for em-
ployer liability depends on the status of the harassing employee. See, e.g.,
Cross v. Cleaver 11, 142 F.3d 1059, 1074 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying strict liabil-
ity in tangible job detriment retaliation claims, but noting that strict liability
may be inappropriate when the retaliating employee is not high enough in the
company hierarchy to impute liability to the employer and the retaliatory ac-
tion is not the product of actual or apparent authority); see also supra notes
70-82 and accompanying text. In most jurisdictions, an employer is only re-
sponsible when an employee harasses a co-worker of equal status if the em-
ployer knew or should have known about the employee's conduct. See RALPH
H. BAXTER, JR. & LYNNE C. HERMLE, SEXUAL HARASMrENT IN THE
WORKPLACE: A GUIDE TO THE LAW 57-58 (3d ed. 2d prtg. 1989); J. Hoult
Vandekerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L.
REV. 273, 282 (1995). For cases in which the harassing employee supervised
the victim, however, the circuit courts have adopted various formulations of§ 219(2) of the Restatement. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Jane Howard-
Martin & Christopher K Ramsey, Supreme Court Stresses Employer Action to
Prevent and Correct Sexual Harassment by Supervisors, METRO. CORP.
COUNS., Aug. 1998, at 7:
Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, litigation standards for sexual har-
assment claims were governed by whether the claim was one of quid
pro quo ... or hostile work environment. This dichotomy resulted in
arbitrary and awkward contortions of claims in order to warrant the
higher standard of employer liability once reserved for quid pro quo
harassment.
89. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
90. Because the analysis in Burlington and Faragher is very similar and
virtually identical in some places, the two cases will often be discussed to-
gether unless there is a specific reason to distinguish between them.
1999] 1497
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ployee pled quid pro quo harassment or hostile work environ-
ment.91 Burlington and Faragher made clear that the deter-
mining factor in the employer liability analysis is whether an
employee experienced a tangible job detriment because of gen-
der.92 The Court reasoned that this distinction is more appro-
priate because an employee cannot inflict a tangible job detri-
ment on another employee without the aid of an agency
relationship with the employer. 93 The employer essentially
acts through the employee in tangible job detriment situations,
thereby making the employer strictly liable.
94
Second, the Court established an affirmative defense for
employers in hostile work environment and unfulfilled quid pro
quo cases, where there is no tangible job detriment. The Court
was less willing to impose strict liability in non-tangible job
detriment cases because the employer's role in the wrongful
behavior is less clear.95 Instead, the Court adopted a two-
pronged test to "accommodate the agency principles of vicari-
ous liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory author-
ity, as well as Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging
91. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). The
Court held that the pleading of quid pro quo instead of a hostile work envi-
ronment claim was no longer the determinative factor in imputing employer
liability, and that courts should instead determine whether the employee suf-
fered a tangible job detriment. See id. Because quid pro quo by definition in-
volves a tangible job detriment, though, and hostile work environment claims
do not, claiming quid pro quo instead of a hostile work environment still nec-
essarily affects courts' analysis of employer liability. If courts are to take the
Supreme Court's distinction between tangible and non-tangible job detriments
at face value, that distinction must be applied uniformly to McDonnell Doug-
las tangible job detriment claims as well as to quid pro quo and hostile work
environment harassment claims.
92. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998); Bur-
lington, 118 S. Ct. at 2265. In other words, the employee is not required to
prove a tangible job detriment to state an actionable Title VII claim, but the
nature of the court's analysis of the claim will vary depending on whether the
plaintiff can prove a tangible job detriment.
93. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269 ("A tangible employment decision
requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act."); see also Faragher,
,118 S. Ct. at 2291.
94. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269; see also Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at
2290. For example, a supervisor cannot fire an employee without the action
showing up in company records or coming to the attention of a superior su-
pervisor. The imposition of a tangible job detriment requires company knowl-
edge and action, if only through the human resources paperwork that neces-
sarily accompanies such decisions. It is therefore reasonable to require a
company to have some knowledge of its supervisor's reasons for imposing a
tangible job detriment upon an employee.
95. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
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forethought by employers and saving action by objecting em-
ployees. 96 After the plaintiff-employee proves that the har-
assment affected the terms and conditions of his or her em-
ployment, 97 the defendant-employer has the opportunity to
prove "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."98 This
practicable affirmative defense for harassment cases has par-
tially changed the landscape of employer liability, but suggests
that the Title VII employer liability landscape must change as
a whole to achieve the equitable resolution of all Title VII
claims.
I. A NEW APPROACH: FOLLOWING PARALLEL PATHS
IN ANALYZING TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION AND
HARASSMENT CLAIMS
A. BURL1NGTONAND FARAGHER ESTABLISH AVALID TEST OF
LIABILITY FOR HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
1. Hostile Work Environment Claimants Must Still Establish
a Prima Facie Case
Following the Burlington and Faragher decisions, lower
courts still require plaintiff-employees to establish a prima fa-
cie case of a hostile work environment. 99 Courts tend to focus
primarily on the fourth prongl0o of the prima facie case because
that prong is most difficult to prove. 101 The tangible job detri-
96. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
97. Plaintiffs must show that the harassment affected the terms and con-
ditions of their employment in order to state an actionable hostile work envi-
ronment claim. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986);
see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
98. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
99. This Note assumes it is necessary to establish a prima facie case(whether through direct or circumstantial evidence) in any discrimination
suit, and therefore focuses its analysis on burden shifting and affirmative de-
fense questions.
100. The fourth prong requires the plaintiff to prove the harassment af-
fected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
10L See, e.g., Caro v. City of Dallas, 17 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627-29 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (focusing on this element in a discussion of actionable hostile work envi-
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ment versus non-tangible job detriment distinction only makes
a plaintiffs ability to prove that the harassment affected "the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" less certain.
While Oncale makes it clear that Title VII was never intended
to be a civility code,102 Burlington suggests that a tangible job
detriment is not necessary; if proven, it only helps the plaintiff
import strict liability to the defendant. 103 It is difficult for a
plaintiff to prove the middle ground-that terms and condi-
tions of employment have changed even though the plaintiff
experienced no tangible job detriment.
The fourth prong of the prima facie case is nonetheless es-
sential to hostile work environment analysis. If this element
were not required, a plaintiff would have the power to hold an
employer liable for teasing or for isolated incidents.104 The new
focus on tangible versus non-tangible job detriments highlights
the injustice in holding an employer liable for isolated inci-
dents or mild teasing. Without this focus on proving an action-
able (if not tangible) job detriment, the employer would essen-
tially be liable for any employee discomfort and Title VII would
become a civility code.
2. The Burlington and Faragher Affirmative Defense Is Well-
Grounded in Public Policy
A major impact of Burlington and Faragher results from
their construction of a new affirmative defense for employers. 105
ronment claims). It does not require a great deal of discovery to prove that
the plaintiff is a female or is a member of a racial minority, that some degree
of harassment (however minor) occurred, or the reason for the alleged har-
assment. It is much more difficult to show, however, that the hostile envi-
ronment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment because this is
a question of severity and degree, and the term or condition is not a tangible
factor.
102. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002
(1998).
103. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
104 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998).
("Simple teasing ... offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless ex-
remely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and
conditions of employment."). As Justice Scalia, author of the majority opinion
in Oncale, also noted, "[tihe critical issue.., is whether members of one sex
are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed." 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
105. The affirmative defense itself is new, but the elements of the defense
have been separately considered by courts before. See Sconce v. Tandy Corp.,
9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 777 n.6 (W.D. Ky. 1998) ("The Supreme Court's announce-
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While some criticize the Court's application of agency doctrine,
the affirmative defense nonetheless considers appropriate legal
and policy factors and serves to impart liability only in appro-
priate situations.1 06
First, it is important to note that neither the Supreme
Court, nor any other court in the United States, is required to
adopt the Restatement of Agency. Commentators have been
quick to criticize the Court's application of agency theory in
employer liability cases. They claim that the Court has a ten-
dency to mix the concepts of "direct liability" and "notice liabil-
ity" and that it fails to separate the types of liability in the
rigid manner the Restatement suggests. 107 The rigid separa-
tion in the Restatement, however, is probably not necessary
because the ultimate question-whether the employer had con-
trol over the employee and the workplace-overrides the dis-
tinction between "notice" and "direct" liability.108 The categori-
zation of agency liability is, after all, an academic question that
serves to justify imposing liability on an employer for failing to
properly control the workplace. The alternate liability theories
under the Restatement should therefore be treated as factors
that help define the extent of the employer's control rather
than as separate tests of the employer's control.
ment of an affirmative defense in some ways is no more than the formal and
succinct statement of a rule already adopted by several circuits."). These cir-
cuits did not, however, consider these elements as part of an affirmative de-
fense. Instead, they looked at them as factors contributing to a determination
of whether an employer should be liable. See id.
106. While this Note does not argue that the Burlington and Faragher de-
fense is appropriate for discrimination claims, it suggests that the discrimina-
tion and harassment claims should follow a parallel and similar path. It
would be pointless to argue that the tests for Title VII should shift slightly to
fit the BurlingtonlFaragher path unless that path is itself a valid starting
point.
107. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing scholars'
various approaches to agency theory in employer liability cases and noting
their criticisms of judicial approaches). It is also important to note, however,
that the Supreme Court is not required to adopt the Restatement of Agency
when it is interpreting federal law. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S.
Ct. at 2265 ("We rely on the general common law of agency, rather than on
the law of any particular State, to give meaning to [agency] terms.") (citations
and internal quotations omitted); see also id at 2266 ("As MeNtor acknowl-
edged, the Restatement (Second) of Agency.. . is a useful beginning point for
a discussion of general agency principles.").
108. This is the purpose of determining whether an employee is acting
within the scope of employment, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (1958), or not, see id. § 219(2).
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Determining the scope of an employer's control is one goal
of the Court's new affirmative defense. While the Justices
purport to base their test on the fact that supervisors are aided
by the agency relationship in carrying out the harassment,
they do consider other factors. The second prong of the af-
firmative defense-that the employee must have unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the employer's remedial measures-
is related to notice liability.109 An employer's anti-harassment
policy will usually include a means by which the harassed em-
ployee can report the harassment without fear of retaliation by
the harasser. This reporting mechanism is necessary to give
the employer notice of the harassment so it can take the proper
remedial actions.110 Without actual or constructive notice of a
harassment problem, it is unjust to hold an employer liable be-
cause the employer has not had an opportunity to remedy the
harassment situation before it rose to a level affecting the
terms of employment.1 Because the second prong of the af-
firmative defense focuses on the employee's attempts to notify
the employer about harassment, notice liability remains part of
this affirmative defense despite the Supreme Court's stated
sole reliance on the "aided by the agency relationship" theory.
109. The Supreme Court noted in Meritor that "absence of notice to an em-
ployer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability." 477 U.S. at
72. It is important to clarify that the Burlington affirmative defense does not
change this. It instead considers whether the employer made avenues avail-
able so it would discover workplace harassment and/or the harassed employee
would have the opportunity to give the employer notice. Hence, the defense
does not look at what the employer knew or should have known; instead, it
considers whether the employer and employee took adequate steps to assure
knowledge.
110. See Stephen D. Shawe & Bruce S. Harrison, High Court Opens Har-
assment Door, Underscoring Need for Prevention, DAILY REC., July 1, 1998, at
3C:
Knowledge is power. In defending against sexual harassment charges
and lawsuits, we have found great benefit in being able to show that su-
pervisors and managers received adequate information to recognize
when a claim was being made, to understand their responsibility to pass
on and participate in investigation of such complaints, and to avoid con-
duct that could be construed as retaliatory.
111. Determining negligence is, consequently, another underlying consid-
eration of this affirmative defense. If an employee did utililize the employer's
preventive and remedial procedures, but the employer chose not to react to
the situation, the employer has failed to exercise a Title VII duty of care.
Practically speaking, per se negligence is then imposed upon the employer.
This imposition is reflected by the employer's inability to prove the affirma-
tive defense when it has not taken appropriate action to remedy a harassment
situation.
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The Burlington and Faragher affirmative defense is also
useful because it requires courts and parties to look to practical
evidence that actually indicates whether employers and em-
ployees acted to prevent and remedy discrimination. Employ-
ers, no matter how vigilant they may be, cannot completely
prevent harassment from occurring in the workplace.112 How-
ever, business choices such as the existence of an anti-
harassment policy, diversity training, a reporting mechanism
for victims, and publication of policies to employees do indicate
the extent to which an employer has fulfilled its Title VII du-
ties. Furthermore, employers can work to prevent and remedy
workplace harassment generally, and they can remedy specific
problems if they have the opportunity to know about them. To
help employers accomplish prevention and correction, it is also
practical to consider the employee's role in reporting harass-
ment and taking advantage of employer policies rather than
suffering in silence and suing later.'13
This affirmative defense is acceptable for an additional
reason: lower courts have already incorporated aspects of the
Burlington and Faragher affirmative defense into their analy-
sis of Title VII harassment claims. The EEOC guidelines,
authors of law review articles, and some courts 14 have all con-
112. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2273 ("Sexual harassment is simply not
something that employers can wholly prevent without taking extraordinary
measures, constant video and audio surveillance, for example, that would
revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible with a free society.")
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Judge Posner's dissent in Jansen v. Packaging
Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, because sim-
ple teasing is not actionable under Title VII, and because the difference be-
tween teasing and harassment is often nebulous, employers may have great
difficulty recognizing actionable harassment without imposing a strict "civility
code" on employees.
113. This dual approach to removing employer liability can be likened to a
negligence and contributory negligence dichotomy. An employer should not be
liable if the employee is negligent in failing to take responsibility for her or his
own well-being.
114 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (quoting the EEOC's amicus
brief in Meritor stating that the availability of an anti-harassment policy and
the employee's attempts to take advantage of that policy are relevant in de-
termining an employer's liability). Indeed, it appears that the EEOC lost the
battle in Meritor (because the Court failed to establish a vicarious liability
standard for all Title VII harassment claims), but ultimately won the war.
Compare the EEOC's amicus brief in Meritor, supra note 52, with Justice
Kennedy's comment in Burlington:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as
a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employ-
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sidered, inter alia, whether the employer had an effective anti-
harassment policy and whether the employer knew of the har-
assment. The federal circuit courts have employed any number
of factors in determining when to impute liability to an em-
ployer, including those factors which have now become the two
prongs of the Burlington and Faragher affirmative defense.I 5
3. The Burlington and Faragher Analysis Is Also Appropriate
in Harassment Cases Involving Other Protected Classes
The standard for a sexually hostile work environment
should not be any different than that for any other protected
class under Title VII,116 despite Justice Thomas's implications
in his dissents to Burlington and Faragher.117 Victims of racial
ment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case
when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that
an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reason-
able care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the em-
ployer's burden under the second element of the defense.
118 S. Ct. at 2270. For an example of a situation in which this analysis was
applied, see Sconce v. Tandy Corporation, 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky.
1998) (applying Burlington's affirmative defense to hostile work environment
case and finding that employer was not liable because employer had effective
anti-harassment policy in place and plaintiff-employee knew about the policy
but failed to utilize it). This case and Justice Kennedy's remark promote this
Note's earlier suggestion that, because the complaint procedure is designed to
give the employer an opportunity to remedy workplace harassment, notice to
the employer is still a factor, if not the factor, in determining employer liabil-
ity.
115. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme constitutes the only
truly unacceptable defense to harassment because there are always more ap-
propriate ways to deal with employees than harassing them. Even if the em-
ployer has a legitimate concern about the employee's working skills or atti-
tude, it is unlikely a jury will be sympathetic to the employer's claim that "I
was only harassing the employee because I didn't like his or her work-it had
nothing to do with race, gender, or religion!"
116. Justice Souter's opinion in Faragher impliedly supports the notion
that the standards should be the same for race and sex harassment. In a
footnote in the Faragher opinion, Justice Souter wrote that "[a]lthough racial
and sexual harassment will often take different forms, and standards may not
be entirely interchangeable, we think there is good sense in seeking generally
to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment." 118
S. Ct. at 2283 n.1. For whatever reason, though, Justice Souter failed to take
the additional step of explicitly stating that the Burlington/Faragher analysis
should apply equally to racial (or religious or national origin) harassment.
Some courts have taken this footnote to mean, though, that standards are the
same for racial and sexual harassment. See Cully v. Miliman & Robertson,
Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
117. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271 (stating concern that employer li-
1504 [Vol. 83:1481
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
and sexual harassment have equal ability to take advantage of
diversity, promotion and anti-harassment policies. Moreover,
it is equally suitable to require an employer to prove the exis-
tence of policies for preventing and remedying racial harass-
ment as it is to require policies for preventing sexual harass-
ment. Finally, it does not matter whether the victim is female
or belongs to another protected class: employers have no more
or less ability to control harassment because the victim is a
member of one protected class rather than another. The kind
of behavior that constitutes illegal discrimination may be dif-
ferent,1 18 but the analysis should follow the same path. Conti-
nuity would benefit both litigants and judges. The affirmative
defense should therefore be applicable to all protected
classes.119
B. PLA]NT S MUST ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACtE CASE IN ALL
TANGIBLE JOB DETRIMENT CASES, BUT A THREE-STEP BURDEN-
SHITING ANALYSIS Is NOT NECESSARY
1. The Hostile Work Environment Affirmative Defense Is
Inappropriate for Tangible Job Detriment Cases
Tangible job detriment cases can involve employer dis-
crimination,12 0 retaliation, constructive discharge, or quid pro
quo suits. In such cases, the employer is expected to have
knowledge of the supervisor's wrongful conduct. 12 1 There is no
ability standards for racially hostile work environment are stricter than those
for sexually hostile work environment); Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2294 (incorpo-
rating Burlington concerns into Faragher dissent).
118. The classic example is that of segregated bathrooms: there are
physiological reasons to segregate men's bathrooms from women's, while it
would be wholly discriminatory to separate Caucasian men's bathrooms from
African-American men's bathrooms.
119. The only thing standing in the way of expanding the Burlington and
Faragher analysis to other protected class harassment cases is the Supreme
Court's failure to make this extension explicit. It could be argued, however,
that the Court simply did not have the appropriate facts before it to make
that extension. Justice Thomas is correct in his statement that the vicarious
liability standard should be no different for racial harassment cases than it is
for sexual harassment cases, see Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2271, and this
commonsense notion may be reason enough to assume the affirmative defense
is applicable to all Title VII harassment/non-tangible job detriment cases.
120. As previously mentioned, "discrimination" encompasses disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases ("glass ceiling" treatment) for the pur-
poses of this Note.
12L See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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need to prove that an employer took steps to prevent or remedy
the imposition of a wrongful tangible job detriment because, in
such situations, the employer simply failed to take responsi-
bility to determine whether the employee's termination was
warranted. 122 Furthermore, the victim often has no opportu-
nity to utilize remedial or preventive policies for either of two
reasons: the victim has not been hired or has been fired and
therefore is not an employee, or the victim suffered one tangi-
ble job detriment which, unlike an ongoing harassment situa-
tion, cannot be remedied midstream. Finally, as Justice Ken-
nedy noted in Burlington, conduct resulting in tangible job
detriments are company acts that the supervisor can only per-
form because of his or her agency relationship with the com-
pany.123 The company is the actual entity acting in such a
situation, and the plaintiff need go no further to prove an
agency relationship. Thus, the Burlington and Faragher af-
firmative defense is not appropriate in tangible job detriment
cases.
2. The McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Analysis Must
Change in Light of the Burlington and Faragher Quid Pro Quo
Analysis
In keeping with the Supreme Court's dictate that the tan-
gible versus non-tangible job detriment distinction is the most
important factor in determining employer liability, courts
should now use a similar, modified analysis for all discrimina-
tion cases. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme
has become burdensome to courts and litigants.124 With the
122. If the case involves mixed (discriminatory/quid pro quo and nondis-
criminatory) motives for firing the employee, an additional step is necessary
in the McDonnell Douglas test. In such situations, the employer can escape
liability only by proving that the employee would have been terminated for
the nondiscriminatory reason alone. This Note does not discuss those situa-
tions, though, for lack of space. In strict retaliatory or quid pro quo cases, it
should be fairly easy for a reasonably diligent employer to discover that the
employee was fired (or demoted, etc.) for improper reasons. A simple exit re-
view of the employee's records, or an exit interview with the employee and his
or her supervisors (together or separately) might easily be enough to discover,
or at least infer, the real reason for termination.
123. 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
124 See Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)(following the lead of "an increasing number of district courts" in conceding
the existence of a prima facie case, "thereby bypassing the much criticized
minuet or burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green," and
citing a number of cases on this point).
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Court's adoption of a new affirmative defense, courts are now
expected to apply the McDonnell Douglas scheme to some
claims and the Burlington and Faragher affirmative defense to
other claims while attempting to maintain some continuity
among all Title VII cases. The McDonnell Douglas test has not
proven inherently inequitable, but it seems inappropriate to
have varying tests for claims arising from a single statute with
the single purpose of protecting certain minority classes. The
Burlington and Faragher affirmative defense is an appropriate
test for non-tangible job detriment cases. It may, however, re-
sult in procedural inequities if the burdens on the parties are
different depending on whether they plead a tangible or non-
tangible job detriment. The McDonnell Douglas test should
therefore be streamlined so that its burdens of proof are consis-
tent with the Burlington and Faragher burdens, but the analy-
sis should remain slightly different to account for the existence
of a tangible job detriment. One way to streamline McDonnell
Douglas is to remove its third burden-shifting step and treat
the second step as an affirmative defense parallel to the
Burlingon and Faragher affirmative defense.
3. A Parallel Scheme Is Needed for All Title VII Tangible Job
Detriment Lawsuits
Courts attempting to deal with the usual laundry list of Ti-
tle VII complaints currently face a burdensome task. It is not
uncommon for courts to apply, all in the same case, the Bur-
lington and Faragher test to the sexual harassment claim, the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to the sex dis-
crimination claim, and the "knew or should have known"
analysis to a race discrimination claim.125 This approach is not
only laborious, but it complicates the discovery and litigation
125. See, e.g., Newton v. Cadwell Lab., 156 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 1998) (dis-
cussing gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims); Rodri-
guez v. Kantor, No. 97-1668, 1998 WL 546098 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1998) (retalia-
tion and national origin discrimination) (unpublished); Cross v. Cleaver II,
142 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 1998) (retaliation and hostile work environment); Joy-
ner v. Fillion, 17 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D. Va. 1998) (hostile work environment,
retaliatory discharge, and racial discrimination); Kolp v. New York State Of-
fice of Mental Health, 15 F. Supp. 2d 323 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (hostile work envi-
ronment and gender discrimination); Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (national origin discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and
hostile work environment); Lovell v. Glen Oaks Hosp. Inc., No. CA397-CV-
318-R, 1998 WL 417774 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 21, 1998) (hostile work environment
and retaliation); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 1998)
(hostile work environment and quid pro quo).
1999] 1507
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
processes because both parties must be on the offensive and
defensive on numerous different grounds. As the burden shifts
back and forth between the parties, the need for extensive dis-
covery and the complications of litigation grow exponentially.
Moreover, because some claims are easier to prove than
others, there is still incentive for a complainant to state multi-
ple grounds for recovery arising out of one Title VII incident.126
A complainant may, for example, plead a retaliation claim, a
discrimination claim, and a constructive discharge claim
knowing the result may be different for each claim depending
on the court's application of McDonnell Douglas and the extent
to which a constructive discharge in the complaint may turn a
hostile work environment claim into a tangible job detriment
claim.127 Even where one claim may not have more merit than
another, the plaintiff may prevail under one doctrine because
of the varied burdens and analyses used in Title VII cases. A
court could, for example, find for the plaintiff on a quid pro quo
claim once the plaintiff proves a threat and a tangible job det-
riment, but for the defendant on a sex discrimination claim be-
cause the defendant has the opportunity to prove a legitimate
business purpose. Because the employer's conduct is virtually
the same in either case, this dichotomy is troublesome. 128
4. Employers Need a Defense When They Have a Legitimate
Reason for Imposing a Tangible Job Detriment
The tests for harassment and conduct that result in a tan-
gible job detriment cannot be exactly the same because, as
126. An example of this kind of pleading can be found in Fierro v. Saks
Fifth Avenue, a case in which the plaintiff claimed "(1) that he was terminated
because [his supervisor and employer] discriminated against him on the basis
of his Italian-American heritage; and/or (2) that he was terminated in re-
taliation for his decision to stand up to [his supervisor's] treatment of him."
13 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (emphasis added).
127. The constructive discharge is a particularly problematic issue in Title
VII analysis after Burlington and Faragher. If the employee pleads a con-
structive discharge (as Kimberly Ellerth did) and the facts support this con-
tention at all, has the employee plead a tangible job detriment such that Bur-
lington and Faragher no longer apply? If so, plaintiff-employees could
essentially turn any hostile work environment claim into a strict liability tan-
gible job detriment case. The Court in Burlington suggested that the facts did
not support Ellerth's constructive discharge claim, so the issue remains unre-
solved. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
128. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 320 & n.48. Scalia suggests that quid pro
quo should not be recognized as a separate cause of action at all because it,
like most discrimination claims, results in an "adverse job action." Id.
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noted above, there is no legitimate business reason for har-
assing an employee. Of course, neither is there a legitimate de-
fense for retaliating against an employee, but employers must
have the opportunity to prove that they imposed a job detri-
ment on an employee for a valid, nondiscriminatory, and non-
retaliatory reason.12 9 There are situations in which an em-
ployer must fire employees for economic, organizational, or per-
formance reasons, and it would be disrupting and unfair to
businesses if the employer had no opportunity to prove a le-
gitimate motive for imposing a tangible job detriment.
This need to preserve the "legitimate business reasons"
analysis for tangible job detriment cases has, however, no
bearing on the precise cause of action for which the employee
brings suit. It is related to the employer's needs and the
American notion of justice that counsels against presuming the
defendant is "guilty" (or, in this situation, that the employer
operated with an improper motive). It should not matter
whether an employee states a quid pro quo claim or a disparate
treatment claim. The employee must first establish that he or
she belongs to a protected class and suffered a tangible job det-
riment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove a le-
gitimate business reason for imposing the detriment or with-
holding the benefit. The defendant might attempt to satisfy its
burden by proving that the detriment had no relation to a su-
pervisor's request for sexual favors, that membership in the
protected class is a bona fide occupational requirement, or that
membership in the protected class carried no weight in the
employer's decision to impose the detriment. 130
129. In such situations, the employer should be liable only on a hostile
work environment basis when the supervisor made threats and unwanted ad-
vances in a quid pro quo suit, but the actual tangible job detriment was not
causally related to the threats. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2273 n.3 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting).
130. The four elements of a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment
are: (1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was sub-jected to unwelcome sexual advances; (3) the request was based on gender;
and (4) submission to the request was a condition for receiving job benefits or
avoiding job detriments. See, e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d
466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995); Kauffman v. Allied Signal Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th
Cir. 1992). Proof of the second and third elements illustrates that the super-
visor had a wrongful motive for imposing a tangible job detriment on the em-
ployee.
Under the new Burlington and Faragher analysis, though, the more im-
portant question for strict liability purposes is whether the employee suffered
a tangible job detriment. The fourth prong as it now stands does not address
this question, but only considers whether a threat was part of the request.
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The analysis would not, then, continue by shifting the bur-
den back to the plaintiff to prove pretext. The "legitimate
business purpose" analysis is, in a sense, the employer's af-
firmative defense. While the Supreme Court has labeled the
end of this analysis "strict liability" in quid pro quo claims,131
courts still give employers the opportunity to prove they had no
discriminatory purpose in imposing a detriment upon an em-
ployee.132 Thus, the employer retains some measure of defense
for its actions even in tangible job detriment cases, but does
not have the benefit of showing that it tried to prevent or rem-
edy the situation. The employer is, essentially, strictly liable
After Burlington and Faragher, it seems far more logical to require the plain-
tiff to prove that he or she suffered a tangible job detriment related at least
temporally to the unwanted sexual advances, and then shift the burden to thedefendant to show a legitimate business purpose for imposing the tangible jobdetriment. This shift would be in keeping with the change (in some jurisdic-
tions) of the prima facie case for hostile work environment claims. Some
courts attached a fifth prong to that test: the employer knew or should haveknown of the harassment and failed to take remedial action. See Callanan v.
Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1996). Under Burlington and Faragher,
the new affirmative defense takes the place of the fifth element, and the bur-den shifts, only once, to the defendant to prove that defense. The legitimate
business purpose defense would accomplish the same feat for all tangible job
detriment cases.
Thus, the test for a quid pro quo action, for example, would have four
prongs: the employee must show (1) that he or she was a member of a pro-
tected class; (2) that he or she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances;(3) that the request was based on gender; and (4) that the employee suffered a
tangible job detriment at least temporally related to the sexual advances. Thedefendant would then have to prove the tangible job detriment was unrelated
to any discriminatory or harassing act on the part of the employer or its su-
pervisors, and the plaintiff could undermine this defense by proving the jobdetriment was directly related to his or her failure to comply with the un-
wanted request. If the plaintiff failed to show this causation, he or she might
still have a claim for hostile work environment under a similar prima facie
case; he or she would only have to prove as prong four that the sexual har-
assment changed the terms or conditions of employment rather than that itimposed a tangible job detriment. This pattern is similar to that which would
be followed for any Title VII tangible job detriment case.
131. Circuit courts have drawn the same conclusion about retaliation
cases. See, e.g., Cross v. Cleaver II, 142 F.3d 1059, 1072-74 (8th Cir. 1998).
132. This is basically a variation on the mixed motive analysis. See supra
note 122. The supervisor may have a mixed motive in imposing a tangible jobdetriment on the plaintiff-employee while the employer only has a legitimatebusiness motive. If the employer has a legitimate motive it considered reason
enough to impose a tangible job detriment and no knowledge of the supervi-
sor's mixed motives, the employer should not be liable for the improper motive
of its supervisor.
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only when the plaintiff proves that a supervisor and the em-
ployer perceptibly violated Title VII.133
5. The Pretext Analysis Is Bound up with the "Legitimate
Business Reason" Analysis and Is Not Necessary As a Third
Step
Courts can take one final step to streamline their analysis
in Title VII cases; they should remove the "pretext" burden-
shifting step altogether. There are a number of reasons for this
proposal. First, the pretext analysis is already bound up with
the "legitimate business purpose" step. If the employer's
stated purpose for imposing a tangible job detriment upon an
employee is pretextual, then it cannot also be legitimate.1 34
133. This result is appropriate not only in light of the common "tangible job
detriment" consequence of discrimination, quid pro quo, and retaliation
claims, but also in light of the agency theories the Supreme Court employed in
Burlington and Faragher. See supra notes 48-49. Just as in harassment tan-
gible job detriment cases, the person hiring, firing, or supervising the em-
ployee could not impose a discriminatory tangible job detriment if not for its
agency powers. Thus, the employer is acting through the discriminating em-
ployee in either situation. Moreover, the employer always retains some re-
sponsibility to monitor its diversity, hiring, firing, and transfer policies and
history.
134. The major complaint in many of the cases cited supra at note 125 is
that McDonnell Douglas is inefficient in reaching the ultimate question: what
was the real reason the supervisor (and therefore the employer) imposed the
tangible job detriment? This Note agrees that this is the ultimate question,
but disagrees that skipping straight to the pretext stage is the proper way to
answer it. To reduce the redundancy of this "minuet," the more appropriate
solution is to incorporate the pretext analysis into the legitimate business
reason analysis. Rather than have the burden shift first to the employer and
then to the employee to prove a legitimate business reason and pretext, re-
spectively, it is more logical to require the employer to prove a business rea-
son that is legitimate and the real basis for the tangible job detriment. This
does not change Justice Scalia's admonition in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks that "the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of
persuasion," despite the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme. 509
U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
This change places the burden to prove legitimate reasons on the entity in
the best position to prove its own motives, the employer. Further, this "one-
step" approach to "legitimate business reason" analysis removes the likelihood
that the parties to a lawsuit will wind up as "two ships passing in the night."
The burden-shifting test encourages employers to argue exhaustively that
they had a legitimate business reason, but the employee will state time and
again that one motive was discrimination, and neither party directly proves
the other wrong. This shift in the McDonnell Douglas analysis does not re-
move the employee's ability and burden to prove pretext, but it allows the par-
ties to more directly argue that one reason was the reason for imposing a tan-
gible job detriment.
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The employee's ability to prove that the purpose was pretex-
tual consequently negates the employer's ability to state a le-
gitimate business purpose.
Ridding the McDonnell-Douglas analysis of this step ar-
guably puts a greater burden on the employer because the bur-
den does not shift back to the plaintiff to prove pretext. In-
stead, it remains with the employer, and the employee merely
prevents an employer from sustaining its burden in proving a
legitimate business purpose. There is, however, a trade-off: the
employer avoids strict liability with the aid of a "legitimate
business purpose" defense, while the employee still has to
prove a causal relation between the illegal act and the tangible
job detriment.
The second rationale for eliminating the final step of the
McDonnell Douglas test is that the burden-shifting scheme has
fallen into some disfavor with courts in recent years. 135 Some
have disapproved of it for its mere ubiquity and others either
seek to avoid shifting the burden multiple times or simply dis-
approve outright of the scheme's redundance. 136 However,
McDonnell Douglas has not lost its usefulness because, as pre-
viously noted, the Burlington and Faragher defense is not ap-
propriate for all situations.137 Streamlining the McDonnell
Douglas test and classifying discrimination cases into only two
categories, tangible and non-tangible job detriment cases, may
reduce the burden associated with applying McDonell Douglas.
Finally, ridding McDonnell Douglas of this third step has
two added benefits for litigants. First, the parties have to
prove similar elements no matter what tangible job detriment
claim the complainant brings. Some considerations will cer-
tainly be different based on the nature of the claim; quid pro
quo is invariably a different situation than retaliation, though
both involve a tangible job detriment. Nonetheless, the com-
mon path of litigation and of each party's burden of proof
makes the applicable legal standard more predictable.
Second, both sides' (and the courts') ability to predict the
path of litigation provides the additional benefit of easier
preparation, and would reduce the number of factors peculiar
to each cause of action. This may in turn reduce the expensive
and invasive discovery efforts of each party. Of course, courts
135. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also supra note 46.
137. See supra Part HI.B.1; see also supra note 106.
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will continue to require separate inquiries into the elements of
the Burlington and Faragher affirmative defense, but the par-
allel litigation of all Title VII claims should ease the burden on
the parties.
This proposed alteration will not change the elements that
either party must prove to succeed in a Title VII lawsuit. Em-
ployees already must establish a prima facie case, and the Su-
preme Court is unlikely to alter its decisions in Burlington and
Faragher in the near future. Because the terminology of dif-
ferent Title VII claims has, however, become increasingly con-
fused every time a new defense to a prima facie case is pro-
posed,138 it is necessary to significantly reduce confusion, if not
eradicate it, by streamlining the conceptualization and analy-
sis of Title VII claims.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's introduction in Burlington and
Faragher of a new approach to sexual harassment analysis
raises new questions about old standards. One of these ques-
tions is whether the new distinction between tangible and non-
tangible job detriment cases and the new affirmative defense
apply equally to all harassment suits. Burlington and
Faragher also make the status and usefulness of the McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting analysis unclear. Because it is
only logical to adjudicate the claims of all harassment plaintiffs
and defendants in the same manner, courts must apply the
same analysis and provide the same affirmative defense for all
litigants regardless of the protected class to which the plaintiff
belongs. Toward this goal, courts should recognize that the
major distinction among Title VII claims is between cases in-
volving tangible and non-tangible job detriments. In addition,
the Burlington and Faragher analysis should be applied to all
harassment and unfulfilled quid pro quo (non-tangible job det-
riment) cases. In tangible job detriment cases, however, the
courts should adopt a streamlined McDonnell Douglas analysis
that disregards the third burden-shifting step as unnecessary.
This reconfiguration will render the McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis more congruent to the Burlington and Faragher analysis,
increase consistency in Title VII litigation, recognize the pri-
138. Consider the analysis discussed supra at notes 39-41, 86, 91-98, 122
and accompanying text.
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mary distinction between classes of job detriments, and subtly
streamline the pleading and litigation stages for all parties.
